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CASENOTES
BOARD OF EDUCATION V. MERGENS:
THE EQUAL ACCESS ACT
E. W. Tucker
RIDGET Mergens, a student at Westside High School in Omaha,
Nebraska, went to the school principal, Dr. Findley, seeking permis-
sion to form a new club. She represented a group of students who
wished to meet after school hours, on school premises, for the purpose of
discussing the Bible and praying together. Dr. Findley denied the request.
A few weeks later the students again sought permission from Dr. Findley
and Dr. Tangdell, associate superintendent of schools, to form a Christian
club. Findley and Tangdell discussed the matter with Superintendent Han-
son, and the three school officials agreed that the request should be denied
on the grounds that a religious club at the school would violate the establish-
ment clause of the first amendment.' Unpersuaded, the students petitioned
the Board of Education of Westside Community Schools to approve the
club's formation. The Board voted to uphold the denial, adding that the
proposed club was inconsistent with Board policy requiring school buildings
to be used only for curriculum-related, school-sponsored activities.
In April 1985, the students, by and through their parents as next friends,
sought injunctive and declaratory relief from the United States District
Court for the District of Nebraska. The students claimed that the School
Board and school officials had deprived them of their first and fourteenth
amendment rights to freedom of speech, association, and free exercise of reli-
gion. Additionally, the students asserted that the school officials, by
preventing the Christian club's formation, violated the Equal Access Act 2
which prohibits public secondary schools from discriminating against stu-
dent groups meeting in the school based on the content of speech at the
meetings.3 The school officials responded that Westside High School did not
fall within the scope of the Equal Access Act ("the Act") and that any appli-
cation of the Act to Westside violated the establishment clause of the
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion.... "). The establishment clause has been made applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
2. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1988).




Finding that Westside High School did not have a limited open forum5 as
defined by the Act and that the school officials had not deprived the students
of their first and fourteenth amendment rights, the district court entered
judgment for the school officials.6 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit reversed.7 The court of appeals held that the lower court
erred in its determination that Westside did not have a limited open forum,
and therefore, a proper application of the Equal Access Act forbade discrim-
ination against the proposed club on the basis of its religious content. 8 The
court of appeals then upheld the constitutionality of the Act, stating that it
did not violate the establishment clause.9 The appellate court reasoned that
the Equal Access Act codified and extended the Supreme Court's decision in
Widmar v. Vincent"° to public secondary schools." The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Equal Access Act
prohibited Westside High School from denying the proposed Christian club
permission to meet on school premises and, if so, whether the Act violated
the establishment clause. Held, affirmed: Since Westside High School main-
tains a limited open forum within the meaning of the Equal Access Act, the
school is prohibited from denying the students' request to form a Christian
club and the Act does not on its face violate the establishment clause. Board
of Education v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 110 L. Ed. 2d 191 (1990).
I. CONFLICT BETWEEN FREE SPEECH AND NONESTABLISHMENT
The United States Constitution protects, among other rights, the funda-
mental freedom for people to express their views. 12 The principles of free
speech allow students to express views that are contrary to those held by
school officials.' 3 In fact, the Supreme Court encourages student exposure
to an exchange of diverse ideas. 14
4. The United States intervened in the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (1988) to
defend the constitutionality of the Equal Access Act. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct.
2356, 2363, 110 L. Ed. 2d 191, 205 (1990).
5. A public secondary school has a limited open forum once it "grants an offering to or
opportunity for one or more noncurriculum related student groups to meet on school premises
during noninstructional time." 20 U.S.C. § 4071(b) (1988).
6. Mergens v. Board of Educ., No. CV 85-0-426, slip op. at 13 (D. Neb. Feb. 2, 1988).
7. Mergens v. Board of Educ., 867 F.2d 1076, 1080 (8th Cir. 1989), aff'd, 110 S. Ct.
2356, 110 L. Ed. 2d 191 (1990).
8. Id. at 1079.
9. Id.
10. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
11. Mergens, 867 F.2d at 1079. In Widmar, the Supreme Court nullified, on free speech
grounds, a state university's regulation that prohibited students from meeting in the school's
facilities for religious discussions. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
13. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
14. Id. at 512. The Court quoted from its decision in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 603 (1967): "The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas
which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of author-
itative selection.'" (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
1943), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)).
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In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,5 the
Supreme Court ruled that restrictions on students' freedom of expression
were permissible only upon specific evidence demonstrating that such ex-
pression would materially and substantially interfere with school activities or
impinge upon other students' rights.16 The school in Tinker violated the
students' constitutional rights when it suspended students for wearing arm-
bands to protest the Vietnam War even though no disruption had oc-
curred. 17 Clearly, any attempt to suppress religious discussions among high
school students would be equally unconstitutional.' 8 Schools are not, how-
ever, obligated to provide students with a forum for extracurricular expres-
sion unless failure to do so would violate a student's free exercise right.19
School officials may assume that students have opportunities outside of
school for religious worship.20
The Supreme Court established a different standard for review in the event
that a school has voluntarily opened a forum for student extracurricular ac-
tivity. 21 The Widmar Court ruled that once the University of Missouri per-
mitted students to initiate extracurricular activities, the school could not
discriminate against student groups merely because school officials disap-
proved of the speech content at the groups' meetings. 22 A school that recog-
nizes a number of secularly oriented clubs bears a heavy burden in
demonstrating a compelling state interest for regulating student religious
groups. 23 Courts have primarily recognized avoidance of an establishment
clause violation as a compelling reason for schools to deny student religious
organizations equal access to their facilities. 24
The Supreme Court adopted a three-part test in Lemon v. Kurtzman 25 for
15. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503.
16. Id. at 511. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
17. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
18. See Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731, 736-37 (E.D. Va.
1977), aff'd per curiam, 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977); Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F.Supp. 1164,
1165-66 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975); Shanley v. Northeast Indep.
School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970-72 (5th Cir. 1972). In these cases, the courts allowed students
to discuss a variety of controversial topics and even permitted students to publish school news-
paper articles about the controversies.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., prohibiting the free exercise
[of religion] .. ").
20. Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038, 1048
(5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 115 (1983) ("A school is obligated to provide religious
facilities only if its failure to do so would effectively foreclose a person's practice of religion.");
accord Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 977 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123
(1981); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-8, at 835 (1978).
21. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981).
22. Id. at 267.
23. Id. at 269-70. See also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461, 464-65 (1980) (statute
distinguishing between labor picketing and other picketing declared unconstitutional).
24. See Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1048; Brandon, 635 F.2d at 973-74; Johnson v. Huntington
Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 15-17, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, 51-53 (1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977); but cf Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48, 54 (W.D. Mich.
1965) (student-initiated religious activity is constitutionally permissible).
25. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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determining when the establishment clause is violated.26 First, a govern-
mental policy must have a secular purpose to be within constitutional lim-
its.27 Second, the principal effect of the policy must be one that does not
advance or inhibit religion. 28 Finally, the policy must not foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion.29
The Supreme Court in Widmar determined that the University of Mis-
souri could allow a religious group to meet in the school and still satisfy the
Lemon test. 30 First, the school maintained a forum open to various student
groups; therefore, the addition of a student-initiated religious club did not
undermine the University's secular aim of merely providing a forum in
which students could exchange ideas.31 Second, the Court explained that
the religious group's incidental benefits from using school facilities did not
constitute primary advancement of religion since all of the student organiza-
tions enjoyed the same benefits.32 Finally, the University would risk greater
entanglement with religion in trying to keep religious speech out of the
forum. 33
Three federal courts of appeal addressed the issue of religious meetings in
public high schools, and all three ruled against such gatherings. 34 In Bran-
don v. Board of Education,35 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
assumed that some impressionable students would perceive school endorse-
ment of religion if the high school permitted prayer meetings in a classroom
immediately before the school day commenced. 36 Additionally, the court
noted that school officials would be required to monitor the religious club to
maintain order and to ensure voluntary participation in the meetings.37 The
court decided that such surveillance would constitute prohibited government
entanglement with religion.38
26. Id. at 612.
27. Id.
28. Id. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968).
29. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
30. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981).
31. Id. at 271-72.
32. Id. at 273-74. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 771 (1973); see also Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 766-67 (1976)
(annual grants to private colleges did not violate establishment clause); Hunt v. McNair, 413
U.S. 734, 741 (1973) (proposed financing of private college did not violate establishment
clause); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961) (laws restricting transactions on
Sundays are not unconstitutional).
33. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271-72.
34. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 560-61 (3d Cir. 1984), va-
cated, 475 U.S. 534 (1986); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669
F.2d 1038, 1048 (5th Cir. 1982); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 980-81 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981). Two courts considered the issue of religious meet-
ings in public schools below the high school level. See Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School Dist.
No. 70., 766 F.2d 1391, 1402-07 (10th Cir. 1985) (policy of elementary school violated estab-
lishment clause); Nartowicz v. Clayton County School Dist., 736 F.2d 646, 649 (11th Cir.
1984) (use of public address system by churches violated establishment clause).
35. Brandon, 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980).
36. Id. at 978-79. The Second Circuit decided that schools violate the establishment
clause if students perceive school endorsement of religion. Id.
37. Id. at 979.
38. Id.
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The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Lubbock Civil Liberties
Union v. Lubbock Independent School District,39 used principally the same
arguments adduced in Brandon to prevent religious meetings in Texas public
schools. 4° In Bender v. Williamsport Area School District,41 the Third Cir-
cuit stressed the importance of focusing on the particular facts of a first
amendment case because there could be circumstances where the establishe-
ment clause would bend to accomodate free speech interests.4 2 The court,
nevertheless, found establishment clause concerns paramount.
43
In 1984, Congress attempted to settle the debate surrounding student reli-
gious groups in high schools by passing the Equal Access Act." The Act
prohibits:
.... any Federally Funded public secondary school45 which has a lim-
ited open forum46 from denying equal access or a fair opportunity to, or
discriminating against, any students desiring to conduct a meeting
47
within that limited open forum on the basis of the religious, political,
philosophical, or other content of the speech at such meetings.
48
II. BOARD OF EDUCATION V. MERGENS
In Board of Education v. Mergens, the Supreme Court applied and ap-
proved the Equal Access Act.49 The Mergens Court addressed two issues:
whether an application of the Act prohibited high school officials from ex-
cluding a student religious club from the school, and whether the Act com-
plied with the establishment clause.50 Justice O'Connor, 51 writing for the
majority, determined that school officials violated the Equal Access Act by
denying the Christian club permission to meet on school property.52 A plu-
rality of the Court then, combined the three-part Lemon test with the logic
advanced in Widmar to hold that the Equal Access Act did not offend the
establishment clause. 53
The majority initially interpreted "noncurriculum related" in order to de-
39. Lubbock, 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982).
40. Id. at 104248.
41. Bender, 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984).
42. Id. at 559.
43. Id. at 561. . . . the constitutional balance of interests tilts against permitting the
[religious] activity to be conducted within the school as a general activity program." Id.
44. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1988). For a summary of the Act's procedural history, see Crewd-
son, The Equal Access Act of 1984: Congressional and the Free Speech Limits of the Establish-
ment Clause in Public High School, 16 J. LAW & EDUC. 167, 170-76 (1987).
45. A secondary school is "a public school which provides secondary education as deter-
mined by State law." 20 U.S.C. § 4072(1) (1988).
46. See supra note 5.
47. Meeting is defined as "those activities of student groups which are permitted under a
school's limited open forum and are not directly related to the school curriculum." 20 U.S.C.
§ 4072(3) (1988).
48. Id. § 4071(a).
49. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 110 L. Ed. 2d 191 (1990).
50. Id. at 2362, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 203.
51. Justices White, Blackmun, Scalia, Marshall, Brennan, Kennedy, and Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined the judgment of the Court.
52. Mergens, 110 S.Ct. at 2370, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 213-14.
53. Id. at 2370-73, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 214-18.
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termine whether Westside High School permitted any such student groups
and thereby maintained a limited open forum, triggering the Equal Access
Act's applicability. 4 Using the antonym of curriculum as defined in Web-
ster's Dictionary, 55 the majority determined that noncurriculum related stu-
dent groups are those groups that are to some degree unrelated to the course
selection offered by the school. 56 The dissent, however, criticized the major-
ity's assumption that noncurriculum is the antonym of curriculum since
"[n]either Webster nor Congress has authorized" this definition. 57
Upon reviewing the legislative history, 58 which the Court found contra-
dictory and inconclusive, the Court determined that Congress intended a
broad interpretation of the phrase since Congress designed the Equal Access
Act "to address perceived widespread discrimination against religious
speech in public schools." 59 Therefore, the majority held that any student
group is noncurriculum related if the school does not teach, and will not
soon teach, the subject matter of the group; if the subject matter of the group
does not concern the body of courses as a whole; if the school does not re-
quire participation in the group for a particular course; and if the school
does not give academic credit for participation in the group.6°
Once the Court defined the phrase noncurriculum related, it easily deter-
mined that Westside maintained a limited open forum. 61 A school may not
avoid creating an open forum by simply stating that all of its existing clubs
further the school's goals in some way.62 If a club's activity is, on its face,
noncurriculum related, the school has an open forum. 63 Since the school
denied the Christian club equal access to school facilities used by other
noncurriculum related groups, Westside's school officials violated the Equal
Access Act. 4
The plurality proceeded to examine the Equal Access Act's effect on the
establishment clause and held that it passed the three-prong Lemon test.65
First, Congress enacted the Act to prevent discrimination against both secu-
54. Id. 110 S. Ct. at 2365, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 207.
55. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 557 (1976). Curriculum is
defined as "the whole body of courses offered by an educational institution or one of its
branches." Id.
56. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2365, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 207.
57. Id. at 2393, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that
"[n]onplus,' for example, does not mean 'minus' and it would be incorrect to assume that a
'nonentity' is not an 'entity' at all." Id.
58. Id. at 2366, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 208. See 130 CONG. REC. 19, 223 (1984) (statement of
Sen. Hatfield). For an analysis of the congressional debate about the Equal Access Act, see
Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 37-39 (1986).
59. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2366, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 208.
60. Id. at 2366, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 209.
61. Id. at 2369, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 212-13. The Court determined that the chess club, scuba
diving club, and peer advocacy program constituted noncurriculum related student groups.
Id.
62. Id. 110 S. Ct. at 2369, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 212. The Court rejected petitioners' argument
that "'curriculum related' means anything remotely related to abstract educational goals"
since such a broad interpretation would make the Act meaningless. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2370, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 213-14.
65. Id. at 2370-73, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 214-18 (plurality). For an extensive history of estab-
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lar and religious speech. 66 The plurality considered Congress's purpose un-
deniably secular. 67 Second, a high school that permits a religious club to
meet in its buildings, along with other noncurriculum related groups, does
not necessarily imply approval of the club's subject matter. 6 Specifically,
the Court rejected the argument that high school students would confuse an
equal access policy with school endorsement of religion. 69 Third, the Act
prohibits school officials from participating in the religious discussions and
permits the meetings only during noninstructional time.70 These provisions,
in addition to ensuring that students will not perceive school endorsement of
religion, prevent school administration of religious activities.71 A faculty
member monitoring the meetings for custodial purposes does not constitute
government entanglement with religion.7 2
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy73 disagreed with the plural-
ity's determination that high schools with equal access policies do not en-
dorse noncurriculum related clubs.74 He stated that schools endorse clubs,
in the common-sense use of the term, simply by allowing such organizations
to use school facilities. 75 A school violates the establishment clause, how-
ever, only if it imposes pressure on students to engage in religious activi-
ties. 76 Thus, according to Justice Kennedy, coercion, not endorsement,
should constitute the test for such a constitutional violation.77
Justice Marshall's 78 concurring opinion approached the endorsement is-
sue differently. Consistent with the plurality, he warned that high schools
must avoid the appearance of endorsing religious clubs.79 Justice Marshall
indicated, however, that the plurality did not adequately stress the duty
placed on high schools to ensure religious neutrality.80 In essence, a school
with few advocacy-oriented groups must disassociate itself from its extracur-
lishment clause doctrine, see Note, The Constitutionality of Student-Initiated Religious Meet-
ings on Public School Grounds, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 740, 741-59 (1981).
66. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2371, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 215 (plurality).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2372, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 216. The Court noted that Congress determined high
school students capable of understanding the difference between student-initiated and state-
initiated religious speech. Therefore, the Court will "not lightly second-guess such legislative
judgments, particularly where the judgments are based in part on empirical determinations."
Id. See generally Note, The Constitutional Dimensions of Student-Initiated Religious Activity in
Public High Schools, 92 YALE L. J. 499, 507-09 (1983) (high school students can make their
own determination).
70. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071(c)(3),(5) (1988).
71. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2373, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 217 (plurality).
72. Id.
73. Justice Scalia joined the concurring opinion.
74. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2377-78, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 223 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 2378, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 223. Endorse means "to approve, support or sustain."
RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 437 (1st ed. 1982).
76. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2378, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 223 (Kennedy, J., concurring). A school
may endorse religious clubs without coercing students to join them. Id.
77. Id.
78. Justice Brennan joined the concurring opinion.
79. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2379, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 224 (Marshall, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 2380-83, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 225-29. Justice Marshall explained:
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ricular program once a religious club is added."'
Justice Stevens wrote a lengthy dissent attacking the majority's interpreta-
tion of noncurriculum related student groups and its failure to distinguish
the university forum in Widmar from the high school forum at Westside.8 2
He argued that since Congress intended to extend the Widmar decision to
high schools when it enacted the Equal Access Act, the limited public forum
in Widmar is comparable to the limited open forum described in the Act.8 3
Therefore, noncurriculum related student groups should be those that advo-
cate "partisan theological, political, or ethical views" similar to the clubs in
Widmar.84
Justice Stevens explained that the purpose of Widmar was to prevent dis-
crimination against advocacy or controversial groups once a school permit-
ted other such organizations to use its facilities. 85 The purpose was not,
however, to force schools to open their facilities to advocacy groups in the
first place.86 Justice Stevens suggested that the majority forces any school
with common clubs, such as chess or scuba diving clubs, to allow religious
and political organizations.8 7
Justice Stevens demonstrated the difficulties that may arise when applying
the Court's definition of "noncurriculum related." 88 For example, the pres-
ence of a football team may bring a school within the Equal Access Act,
Given the nature and function of student clubs at Westside, the school makes
no effort to disassociate itself from the activities and goals of its student clubs.
The entry of religious clubs into such a realm poses a real danger that those
clubs will be viewed as part of the school's effort to inculcate fundamental val-
ues. The school's message with respect to its existing clubs is not one of tolera-
tion but one of endorsement. As the majority concedes, the program is part of
the "district's commitment to teaching academic, physical, civic, and personal
skills and values." [citation omitted]. But although a school may permissibly
encourage its students to become well-rounded as student-athletes, student-mu-
sicians, and student-tutors, the Constitution forbids schools to encourage stu-
dents to become well-rounded as student-worshippers. Neutrality toward
religion, as required by the Constitution, is not advanced by requiring a school
that endorses the goals of some noncontroversial secular organizations to en-
dorse the goals of religious organizations as well.
Id. at 2380, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 225-26 (footnotes omitted).
81. Id. at 2382-83, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 229.
82. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2383-93, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 229-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 2384-85, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 231-32. Justice Stevens noted:
As the Court of Appeals correctly recognized, the Act codified the decision in
Widmar, "extending its holding to secondary public schools." [citation omitted].
What the Court of Appeals failed to recognize, however, is the critical difference
between the university forum in Widmar and the high school forum involved in
this case. None of the clubs at the high school is even arguably controversial or
partisan.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
84. Id. at 2385, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 232.
85. Id. at 2386-87, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 233-34.
86. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2386, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 233. Justice Stevens argued that
"[nlothing in Widmar implies that the existence of a French club, for example, would create a
constitutional obligation to allow student members of the Ku Klux Klan or the Communist
Party to have access to school facilities." Id. (footnote omitted).
87. 110 S. Ct. at 2391, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 239.
88. Id at 2387-88, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 235.
depending on whether flag football is also taught in a physical education
class.8 9 Additionally, schools may be able to constantly manipulate the
Act's applicability by altering the subjects taught in classes.90 In concluding
his dissent, Justice Stevens stated that the Court should have defined noncur-
riculum as the subjects that "cannot properly be included in a public school
curriculum." 9 1
III. CONCLUSION
In Board of Education v. Mergens, the Supreme Court held that the Equal
Access Act prohibits public high schools from discriminating against
noncurriculum related student groups based on the content of speech at their
meetings. The Court ruled that Westside High School, which maintained a
limited open forum for noncurriculum related groups, violated the Act when
it denied equal access to a Christian club. Additionally, the Court stressed
that Congress intended the Equal Access Act to apply to most high schools.
Few schools, therefore, will be able to use the establishment clause as a basis
for excluding religious groups.
89. Id. at 2388, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 235. Justice Stevens explained:
The Court's analysis makes every high school football program a borderline
case, for while many schools teach football in physical education classes, they
usually teach touch football or flag football, and the varsity team usually plays
tackle football. Tackle football involves more equipment and greater risk, and
so arguably stands in the same relation to touch football as scuba diving does to
swimming.
90. 110 S. Ct. at 2387, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 234-35.
91. Id. at 2393, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 242.
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